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Abstract. Interest of STI policies to influence the innovation behaviour of firms 
has been increased considerably. This gives rise to the notion of behavioural 
additionality, broadening traditional evaluation concepts of input and output 
additionality. Though there is empirical work measuring behavioural 
additionalities, we know little about what role distinct firm characteristics play 
for their occurrence. The objective is to estimate how distinct firm 
characteristics influence the realisation of behavioural additionalities. We use 
survey data on 155 firms, considering the behavioural additionalities stimulated 
by the Austrian R&D funding scheme in the field of intelligent transport 
systems in 2006. We focus on three different forms of behavioural additionality 
– project additionality, scale additionality and cooperation additionality – and 
employ binary regression models to address this question. Results indicate that 
R&D related firm characteristics significantly affect the realisation of 
behavioural additionality. Firms with a high level of R&D resources are less 
likely to substantiate behavioural additionalities, while small, young and 
technologically specialised firms more likely realise behavioural additionalities. 
From a policy perspective, this indicates that direct R&D promotion of firms 
with high R&D resources may be misallocated, while attention of public 
support should be shifted to smaller, technologically specialised firms with 
lower R&D experience.  
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1  Introduction  
 
Theoretical considerations for the evaluation of Science Technology and Innovation (STI) policy 
programmes have regained great interest in the recent past (see, for instance, OECD 2006). 
Though government support for R&D has been offered for several decades in most industrialized 
countries, the evaluation of such STI policies has lagged behind. Impact assessment of policy 
measures remains challenging as it is difficult to isolate the impact of a specific policy 
programme from the general economic firm-internal background as well as external conditions 
influencing a firms´ innovation performance (see, for instance, Georghiou and Clarysee 2006). 
Thus, modern policy evaluations often take an additionality perspective to overcome the problem 
of attributing particular effects at the firm level to specific policy contributions or firm 
endeavours (see, for instance, Hsu 2009). The additionality concept aims to measure the extent to 
which public policy support stimulates new R&D activities as opposed to subsidising what would 
have taken place anyway (see Buisseret 1995). Next to the traditional additionality concepts, 
input additionality and output additionality, used by policy makers, particular attention has been 
recently given to the concept of behavioural additionality (see Buisseret 1995, Luukkonen 2000, 
Autio et al. 2008). The latter emphasises the importance of measuring how policy programmes 
influence the innovation behaviour of firms, referring to changes in the firm´s innovation 
behaviour directly attributable to the participation of that firm in a specific STI policy 
programme. This is related to the fact that modern STI policies – mainly based on the system 
failure rather than the market failure perspective (see Falk 2007) – shift emphasis to the 
acquisition of learning capabilities and problem-solving skills, including the ability to know 
where complementary expertise can be found. 
 
Following these conceptual considerations, various empirical studies use the behavioural 
additionality concept for the evaluation of specific STI policy programmes. One notable recent 
example is the evaluation study of OECD (2006) providing a compilation of twelve evaluation 
studies of behavioural additionality effects in R&D policy programmes implemented in different 
OECD countries. Most studies focused on direct government funding of business R&D, but 
others examined public-private partnership programmes and tax incentives for R&D, using 
mainly survey based data analysed by descriptive statistics and exploratory data analysis 
techniques. In general, the studies provide important empirical insight into behavioural effects of 
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governmental R&D funding and, thus, underline the significance of the behavioural additionality 
concept as an expansion to traditional evaluation approaches.  
 
However, from previous empirical work on behavioural additionality we know only little about 
how distinct firm characteristics influence the realisation of such additionalities. This is an 
important question for the future design of STI policy programmes that explicitly address the 
realisation of behavioural additionalities. Some few recent exceptions of empirical work that – at 
least to some extent – focuses on this question are the studies by Clarysee et al. (2009), Hsu et al. 
(2009) and Falk (2007). The study by Clarysee et al. (2009) identifies determinants of the 
behavioural additionality of R&D grants to explain the mechanism through which behavioural 
additionality is obtained using data on R&D grants provided in the region of Flanders in Belgium 
between 2001 and 2004. The results provide evidence that a higher number of external partners in 
funded R&D projects leads to increased behavioural additionality effects. However, these effects 
decrease with the number of subsidized projects that are undertaken by the firm. Hsu et al. (2009) 
investigate the behavioural additionality of government subsidies on strategic changes in the 
R&D behaviour of 127 firms in Taiwan. The results show that firms in different industry sectors 
and innovation categories emphasize different types and intensities of behavioural additionality. 
Falk (2007) relates observed additionalities of 1200 Austrian firms to different firm 
characteristics and their perceived barriers to innovation. The results show that start-up firms on 
average realize more behavioural effects than mature firms while at the same time additionalities 
slightly increase with firm size.  
 
The study at hand follows this research stream by focusing drivers of behavioural additionalities 
in the light of different firm characteristics, including structural and R&D related characteristics. 
The objective is to estimate how distinct firm characteristics influence the realisation of 
behavioural additionalities. We use survey data on 155 firms and consider the behavioural effects 
stimulated by the policy programme IV2S that granted R&D subsidies in the year 2006 in the 
field of intelligent transport systems in Austria. The focus is on three different forms of 
behavioural additionality as captured by the survey – project additionality, scale additionality and 
cooperation additionality. Project additionality refers to the situation in which a project would 
have been cancelled or not started, if public support had been rejected. Scale additionality 
describes the case in which the funded project is conducted on a larger scale than previously 
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intended, while cooperation additionality denotes the impact of public R&D support on the 
collaboration and networking behaviour of firms. We employ a binary regression approach to 
address these research questions.  
 
By this, the study departs from existing empirical literature in at least three major respects. First, 
we introduce a conceptual framework for analysing firm-specific drivers of behavioural 
additionality, putting special emphasis on firm-internal R&D related characteristics that may 
influence the realisation of specific types of additionalities. Second, we employ logistic binary 
regression models to identify firm specific characteristics influencing the realisation of 
behavioural additionalities. Third, we combine data on behavioural additionality with other 
relevant databases covering R&D related firm characteristics, in particular with the patent 
database of the European patent office (EPO) and the internal database of the Austrian Research 
Promotion Agency (FFG). By this, the study produces novel empirical insight on how 
behavioural effects of public R&D subsidies differ across specific firm characteristics, and, thus, 
add significant value to the scarce empirical literature in this research field.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the concept of behavioural 
additionality in some detail, focusing on different dimensions and peculiarities of this specific 
evaluation approach. Section 3 elaborates on the conceptual framework that is used for the 
empirical analysis and introduces the main hypotheses to be tested, before Section 4 describes the 
binary logistic regression modelling approach, the data used and the construction of the 
dependent and independent variables. Section 5 presents the estimation results for the three types 
of behavioural additionality under consideration by means of the logistic regression models 
estimated using Maximum Likelihood estimation procedures, while Section 6 closes with a 
summary of the main results, some concluding remarks and ideas for a future research agenda.     
 
2  The concept of behavioural additionality  
  
The classical theoretical rationale for governmental R&D subsidies is mainly based on the well-
known market failure argument (Arrow 1962, Nelson 1959). This approach refers to leakages and 
spill-overs that reduce the propensity of firms to innovate as they cannot fully capture the benefits 
of their R&D investments. Thus, public intervention from this background is needed to 
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compensate for underinvestment in R&D in the private sector (see David et al. 2000). Taking this 
traditional market failure perspective in the context of R&D policy programme evaluations, 
policy makers are looking for empirical evidence of the leverage effect of the policy programmes, 
i.e. they are interested to estimate multiplier effects of their R&D subsidies on the total amount of 
firms´ R&D investments. This gives rise to the notion of input additionality in traditional 
evaluation approaches of R&D policy programmes (see OECD 2006). Its focus is on estimating 
to what extent a specific policy programme contributes to additional investments in R&D by the 
receiving firm. If this is not the case, these public funds just introduce inefficiencies or serve as 
substitutes for R&D that would have taken place also without funding (often referred to as 
crowding out effect) (see Clarysee et al. 2009). Next to leverage effects on private R&D 
investments, policy makers became increasingly interested in the impact of R&D subsidies on 
innovative output of firms, giving rise to evaluation concept of output additionality (see Klette et 
al. 2000). As defined by Luukonnen (1998), output additionality refers to the extent of additional 
outputs of the firms´ innovation efforts as a result of public R&D subsidies, often measured in 
terms of sales or patents.  
 
Over the recent past, it has been criticized, both by policy makers and the scientific community 
(see, for instance, Georghiou 2002), that these traditional evaluation concepts are too narrow in 
light of new insights on the role of the public hand for supporting innovation processes. The 
traditional perspective relies – as mentioned above – mainly on the market failure argument, and 
thus, is based on outdated models of the innovation process, namely models that describe the 
generation of innovations as a linear process (see, for instance, Edquist 2005). When considering 
the nowadays widely accepted systemic view on innovation processes, where innovations are 
created within a complex web of interactions between different actors of the innovation system 
(see, for instance, Fischer 2001), it seems obvious that the traditional evaluation concepts are 
unsatisfactory in this context. They overlook important elements that, however, need to be 
considered when evaluating modern STI policy programmes; modern STI policies shift emphasis 
to systemic failures and the acquisition of additional learning capabilities and problem-solving 
skills as a result of public intervention. This lack in the evaluation concepts of input and output 
additionality has led to the implementation of an additional evaluation dimension focusing on 
changes in the firm´s innovation behaviour. This gives rise to the notion of behavioural 
additionality that can be assessed in the short term, but may also lead to additional innovation 
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inputs and outputs in the long term. The concept of behavioural additionality aims to measure 
changes in the firm´s innovation behaviour directly attributable to the participation of that firm in 
a specific STI policy programme (see Buisseret 1995). It is one way to face the changing 
requirements of R&D policy programmes, and to detect related effects of governmental policy 
interventions from a systemic point of view (Falk 2007, OECD 2006).  
 
Behavioural additionalities are expected to result from any R&D policy instrument (Georghiou 
2002), and can therefore be applied in several evaluation studies. The concept attempts to capture 
the impact of public intervention on the innovation process itself and focuses not only on direct 
effects, but also on indirect impacts on the firm’s behaviour and its strategy. Although 
behavioural changes can be interpreted as intermediate results of public funding, their impacts are 
expected to persist beyond the period of the supported activity (OECD 2006). Long-term learning 
effects may be integrated into the firm’s capabilities and may additionally have structural and 
institutional impacts on the entire system (Georghiou 2002). Behavioural additionality is 
therefore positioned between input additionality and output additionality, trying to open the black 
box and to recognise the underlying forces related to firm innovation processes (OECD 2006, 
Larosse 2004). By this, it tries to address the questions of how public support interacts with the 
capabilities and strategies of firms, including issues of competence building, skills in managing 
R&D processes as well as strategic alliances with other actors (e.g. suppliers, competitors, 
science organisations) involved in the R&D process.  
 
Behavioural changes caused by public funding are expected to be ambiguous and manifold1. In 
the current study we focus on three specific dimensions of behavioural additionality that are 
captured by our survey based data (see Section 4):  
 
i) Project additionality refers to the project launch and corresponds to the situation in 
which a project would have been cancelled or not started, if public support had been 
rejected. It can be distinguished between “pure” project additionality (project 
                                                 
1  For this reason, until recently a number of different categorisations of behavioural changes emerged in the literature. As 
behavioural effects are very fuzzy and difficult to identify, the types are diffuse and may overlap in parts. An overview on 
different types of behavioural additionalities is given by Falk (2007). 
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continuation without any changes) and “partial” project additionality (adaptations in 
size, scope or timing of the project). 
ii) Scale additionality describes the case in which a specific R&D project is conducted on a 
larger scale after public R&D funding has been provided than previously intended by the 
conducting firm(s). 
iii) Cooperation additionality is in place when public support influences the collaboration 
behaviour of firms receiving R&D subsidies. This may be the case when public R&D 
support helps to create cooperations with new or diversified partners in the public and 
private sector, or where collaboration and joint R&D activities are continued even if the 
project has expired. 
 
From this perspective, behavioural additionality is a multidimensional concept and refers to 
effects on different levels and aspects of the innovation process. Thus, an appropriate conceptual 
framework for the empirical analysis of the determinants of behavioural additionality at the firm 
level needs to be defined in the section that follows. 
 
 
3   Behavioural additionality and firm-specific characteristics 
 
The concept of behavioural additionality has come into wide-spread use in evaluation studies of 
policy programmes in various countries (see OECD 2006). However, the relationship of distinct 
firm characteristics – such as firm size, firm age or the firm´s R&D capacity – and the realisation 
of different types of behavioural additionalities remain unclear from previous evaluation studies. 
In this section we present a conceptual framework for our empirical analysis that is intended to 
indentify such firm-specific drivers of behavioural additionalities. The framework relies on 
previous empirical work in this direction (see Clarysee et al. 2009, Hsu 2009, Falk 2007), but 
expands the analytical scope of these studies by focusing on R&D relevant firm characteristics 
that may influence innovation behaviour, and, thus, also the realisation of behavioural 
additionalities at the firm level.  
 
Theoretical and empirical literature discusses different aspects of firm-internal determinants of 
innovation behaviour. The main dimensions that have been taken into account in previous 
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empirical work are structural and organisational characteristics of the firm, while R&D relevant 
factors, such as R&D expenditures, were often – possibly due to data limitations – neglected (see, 
for instance, Falk 2007). The conceptual framework of the current study takes into account firm-
internal characteristics that may be distinguished into resource-based factors, and factors related 
to the strategic orientation of the firm (see, for example, Galende J and De la Fuente JM 2003, 
Teece et al. 1997, Teece 2010, Barney 1991). Concerning resource-based factors, we include 
structural and organisational resources of the firm. As a proxy for structural resources we make 
use of the firm size, while firm age is used as a proxy for organisational resources (see Falk 2007 
for a discussion on how firm size and firm age may influence the realisation of behavioural 
additionalities). Further, we use information on R&D related resources and competences as 
captured by the firm´s R&D intensity as an important resource-based factor. Concerning 
characteristics related to the firm´s strategy, we include the firm´s internationalisation strategy 
that may be an important determinant for the realisation of different behavioural additionalities. 
Also in the context of the firm´s strategic orientation R&D related factors may be relevant. Thus, 
our analytical framework comprises the technological specialization and the R&D collaboration 
strategy. In what follows, we focus on the derivation of the R&D related factors mentioned above 
and their role for the realisation of behavioural additionalities, and formulate our guiding 
hypotheses to be tested in the empirical analysis. We refrain from a more detailed elaboration on 
the general firm characteristics, such as firm size and firm age, as they are sufficiently discussed 
in the literature (see, for instance, Cohen 2010).  
 
R&D-related resources and competences  
 
Measures of R&D-related resources and competences are, for instance, the firm’s R&D intensity, 
R&D expenditures, R&D personnel, the existence of a formal R&D department in the company, 
or the regularity of their R&D activities (see, for instance, Galende J and De la Fuente JM 2003). 
In the current study, R&D resources and competences are captured by the experience in the 
particular research field, and the R&D intensity of the firm. These factors are strongly correlated 
and appear jointly in most firms. R&D intensive firms invest comparatively large amounts in 
their R&D activities; R&D is incorporated in the firms’ strategy and formalised at a high level. 
Experience and domain expertise indicate specific competences, which have been evolved in 
prior research activities. Hence, firms are able to benefit from their elaborated knowledge base 
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and their enhanced absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990). These aspects lead to the 
assumption that firms with higher R&D-related resources and competences are less dependent on 
public support, as they would carry out their “priority projects” anyway. Therefore the likelihood 
to modify or cancel major projects is lower. They rather adapt size, time horizon or scope of their 
projects and investments. On the contrary, a higher absorptive capacity allows them to better 
exploit external knowledge and to achieve valuable outcomes. Considering the high internal 
R&D resources and competencies, they are less dependent on collaboration partners providing 
them with lacking R&D capacities. This leads to the following hypotheses: 
  
 
Hypothesis (i): Project additionality decreases with a higher level of R&D resources and  
competences, i.e. the probability of realising project additionality is higher 
in non-R&D intensive and unexperienced firms. 
Hypothesis (ii): Scale additionality increases with a higher level of R&D resources and  
competences, i.e. the probability of realising scale additionality is higher in 
 R&D intensive and experienced firms. 
Hypothesis (iii): Cooperation additionality decreases with a higher level of R&D resources  
and competences, i.e. the probability of realising cooperation additionality 
is higher in non-R&D intensive and unexperienced firms. 
 
Technological specialisation 
 
Technological diversification or specialisation determines the firm’s R&D and innovation 
behaviour (Breschi et al. 2003). In conducting R&D and innovation, a firm has to take the 
decision whether to operate in diversified fields or to focus on just a small number of 
technological fields. Through specialisation of research activities, a firm may benefit from a more 
efficient learning process and knowledge transfer. They have a more sophisticated knowledge 
base and, thus, achieve a higher degree of expertise. Further, specialised firms may easier gain 
comparative advantages in a specific technology field (Garcia-Vega 2006). Nevertheless, there 
are also theoretical considerations that assume a positive relationship between technological 
diversification and R&D or rather innovation activities. Large, diversified firms may benefit from 
complementaries among various activities occurring together (Teece 2010; Breschi et al. 2003). 
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Advantages arise from knowledge and learning spill-overs in related technology fields sharing a 
common knowledge base, but also from combining the expertise in unrelated technologies. This 
may lead to new and creative insights in a specific field. 
 
This study takes into account the effects of the degree of diversification of the firms’ 
technological knowledge base on behavioural additionality. The opportunity to spread costs and 
risk of R&D across several fields is rather limited in technologically specialised firms. Hence, it 
is assumed that specialised firms are more dependent on public R&D funds in realising their 
projects. They are more risk averse and investigate a more accurate prior impact assessment of 
their activities. Due to their high degree of specialisation they rely on external collaboration 
partners in conducting their R&D activities. They seek for new partners with supplemental 
resources and capabilities. Further it is assumed that specialised firms focus their activities on 
only a small number of projects. If public support is denied, an adjustment of the project size or 
scope would be more difficult for highly specialised firms. In this context, the following 
hypotheses are to be tested in the empirical analysis:  
 
Hypothesis (iv): Project additionality increases with the degree of specialisation of the firm,  
i.e. the probability of realising project additionality is higher in 
technologically specialised firms. 
Hypothesis (v): Scale additionality decreases with the degree of specialisation of the firm,  
i.e. the probability of realising scale additionality is higher in 
technologically diversified firms. 
Hypothesis (vi): Cooperation additionality increases with the degree of specialisation of the  
firm, i.e. the probability of realising cooperation additionality is higher in  
 technologically specialised firms. 
 
Collaboration strategy 
 
The collaboration strategy refers to the firm’s strategy of how to organise R&D activities. It is 
another specific aspect determining the firm’s R&D and innovation behaviour. Firms decide 
whether to engage in R&D cooperation, with how many partners and with which type of partners 
(customer, supplier, competitor, scientific research organisation). The choice of partners depends 
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on firm-specific characteristics (structure, industry, and organisation of the firm), on the type, 
strategy and target of its own R&D and innovation efforts (product or process innovation, basic 
or applied research or technological development), as well as on the costs involved in cooperating 
with others (Paier and Scherngell 2011).  
 
In this study, it is assumed that both, a firm’s collaboration strategy as well as its prior and 
existing network relations, influence behavioural effects of public R&D funding. Firms that have 
already organised their R&D within partnerships have gained experience in collaborations and 
developed a significant level of trust in cooperating with partners. Moreover, they are already 
experienced with sharing knowledge and have developed specific modes of managing 
appropriability and intellectual property aspects. They have developed a positive attitude towards 
cooperation, and, thus, may already have access to sufficient collaboration partners. In contrast, 
their likelihood of changing their behaviour as a result of public funding, especially in terms of 
cooperating with new partners, may be higher. The hypotheses derived in the context of the 
firm´s collaboration strategy are the following: 
  
Hypothesis (vii): Project additionality decreases with the involvement in prior R&D  
collaborations, i.e. the probability of realising project additionality is  
 higher in non-collaboration intensive firms. 
Hypothesis (viii): Scale additionality decreases with the involvement in prior R&D  
collaborations, i.e. the probability of realising scale additionality is  
 higher in non-collaboration intensive firms. 
Hypothesis (ix): Cooperation additionality increases with the involvement in prior R&D  
collaborations, i.e. the probability of realising cooperation additionality is  
 higher in collaboration intensive firms.  
 
 
4   Empirical model, data and variables 
   
This section sheds some light on the empirical setting of the current study. We introduce the 
binary regression modelling approach that is used to estimate how behavioural additionalities 
differ across distinct firm-specific characteristics, and discuss in some detail the construction of 
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the dependent and the independent variables. The core data for our empirical analysis comprise 
survey based data on behavioural additionalities resulting from the Austrian STI policy 
programme Intelligent Transport Systems and Services – IV2S, carried out by the Austrian 
Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology (BMVIT)2. The survey on behavioural 
changes was conducted in the year 2006 among 155 firms that were funded by the Programme 
(see Geyer 2006 for further details on the programme and results of the survey). To address our 
research question, we match the survey data with other databases that contain systematic 
information on the firm characteristics mentioned in the previous section. In this context we rely 
on the Aurelia database that contains general characteristics of firms located in Austria, the 
internal database of the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG) that comprises data on R&D 
related resources of firms that have been funded by Austrian funding schemes, the EUPRO 
database of the Austrian Institute of Technology featuring data on international project 
collaborations within the European Framework Programmes (FP), and the PATSTAT database of 
the European Patent Office (EPO) containing systematic information on EPO patent applications. 
In what follows, we initially introduce the empirical model used to describe the relationship 
between behavioural additionalities and distinct firm characteristics, before we describe the 
dependent and independent variables in some detail.  
 
The empirical model 
 
In this study we aim to estimate how distinct firm characteristics influence the realisation of 
behavioural additionalities at the firm level. Thus, we seek to model the realisation of a specific 
type of behavioural additionality at the firm level dependent on various firm characteristics 
according to our analytical framework introduced in the previous section. As behavioural 
additionality is measured by binary dependent variables (see the detailed description of the 
variables below), we employ a binary probability modelling approach. Probability models have 
come into fairly wide use to explain the probability of an event occurring dependent on various 
exogenous factors (see, for instance, Long and Freese 2001). Among the different conceptual 
                                                 
2  The programme was running from 2002 to 2006 and focused on the promotion of research and development in the transport and 
mobility sector. One of the main objectives of the programme was to pool several public R&D and innovation funding 
initiatives in the transport sector. The overall objective of the programme referred to technological development and 
environmental issues by means of innovative transport solutions and applications (Geyer 2006).  
13 
 
approaches to derive a binary probability model (see Greene 2003), we rely on the latent variable 
model that is based on a latent or unobservable endogenous variable, which is captured by a 
measurable and observable response with a binary outcome. In our case, the latent variable 
corresponds to change processes in a firm´s innovation behaviour that is unobservable, but the 
outcome of this change process may be captured by an observable response variable.   
 
We assume that our firms ( 1, ..., 155)i i n   participating in the IV2S may change their 
innovation behaviour due to their participation in the programme in a distinct way. A change in 
behaviour stimulated by the programme may be formulated by the following latent regression 
 
*
Y = Xβ+ ε   (1) 
 
where Y
*
 = (Yi
*
; i = 1, ..., n) is the n-by-1 vector of latent responses, X is an n-by-K matrix of 
explanatory variables (including the constant), with Xik denoting the measurement of the k-th 
characteristic (indexed k = 1, ...., K-1) on firm i, β is the associated K-by-1 parameter vector, and 
ε an n-by-1 random error term. Since the responses Yi
*
 are unobservable, we follow common 
practice and define a link between the latent change in behaviour Yi
*
 and the binary response 
variable Yi = (Yi
 
; i = 1, ..., n) as defined by 
 
*
*
1 if  > 0
0 if 0.
i
i
i
Y
Y
Y





  (2) 
 
In this study the Yi (indexed i = 1, ..., n) are observed by surveying respondents, whether they 
have realised behavioural effects due to public R&D funding within the IV2S programme, which 
would not have occurred otherwise. Yi = 1 if firm i realises behavioural additionality, while Yi = 0 
otherwise. The study distinguishes – as mentioned in the previous section – between three 
different types of behavioural additionality that will be specified formally in the next section. The 
probability of Yi = 1 depends on a set of firm-specific characteristics gathered in the  
i-th row of X, that is Xi, leading to the probability model Pr( 1| ) 1 ( )i i iY F   X X β  (see 
Greene 2003 for details), where F(.) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of εi. 
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To get a measurable we need to specify F(.). As is common practice, we assume εi to be 
logistically distributed, leading to the well known logit model, in our case given by 
 
exp ( )
Pr( 1 ) ( )
1 exp ( )
i
i ii
i
Y    

X β
X X β
X β
 (3) 
 
where Λ(.) indicates the logistic cumulative distribution function3. β is derived from maximum 
likelihood (ML) estimation procedures4.  
 
The dependent variables 
 
Data on behavioural additionality of the strategic research and development initiative “Intelligent 
Transport Systems and Services” – IV2S come from a survey among programme participants 
carried out in 2006 (see Geyer 2006 for details on the survey). Three specific questions of the 
survey cover – as mentioned above – three different types of behavioural additionality that are 
used as dependent variables:  
 
Project additionalities appear, if the research project would have been cancelled, unless it has 
been supported by public funds. Project additionality refers to the counterfactual situation. It is 
captured by the response option of a multiple-choice question “We would not have continued the 
project“. The dependent variable is defined by 
 
1 1 if project additionality occurs for firm0 otherwisei
i
Y   (4) 
 
                                                 
3  Note that the probit model using the standard normal cumulative distribution function is often used as alternative 
specification. Given the similarities between the logit and the probit model, it does usually not make much difference which 
model specification is applied (see, for example, Greene 2003). In the context of this study, we prefer the logit version as the 
estimates can be more intuitively interpreted in terms of odds-ratios (see Long and Freese 2001).  
4 For details on maximum likelihood see, for example, Greene (2003, pp. 670-673). 
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Scale additionality refers to the situation in which the project is conducted on a larger scale than 
without public funding. The response option “We would have run the project on a smaller scale” 
is associated with the dimension of scale additionality, which is defined by 
 
2 1 if scaleadditionality occurs for firm0 otherwisei
i
Y   (5) 
 
Concerning cooperation additionality, respondents were questioned for collaborations with new 
partners (“Did you run the project with new partners?“). This means, if public funding helps to 
create new types of collaborations, cooperation additionality is apparent. The response for 
cooperation additionality is specified by 
 
3 1 if cooperation additionality occurs for firm0 otherwisei
i
Y   (6) 
 
The independent variables 
 
The independent variables are chosen on the basis of the conceptual framework described in the 
previous section. Let the k-th columns of X be a set of firm-specific characteristics kX  (k = 1, ...., 
K–1), which may influence the existence of behavioural additionality. Concerning general firm 
characteristics, we use the firm size, 1X , measured in terms of the number of employees and used 
in logarithmic form. The age variable, 2X , is defined as the difference between the year of 
project launch within the firm i and the founding year of i. The age of the firm is a proxy variable 
for established organisational resources and competences as well as experience in business, R&D 
and public support. Export activity, 3X , is defined by 3iX  = 1 if the firm records exports, and 3iX
 
= 0 otherwise. A firm’s export activity is one possible measure for the firm’s orientation on 
foreign markets and its degree of internationalisation.  
 
The emphasis of this study is on R&D related characteristics: R&D intensity, 4X , is, following 
common practice, defined by the R&D expenditures of i divided by total sales. This variable 
indicates whether the firm holds a formal in-house R&D department or promotes R&D activities 
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on a continuous basis. Experience in research field, 5X , is defined as a dummy variable which is 
taken from the online survey5. It serves as a proxy variable for the firm’s learning and absorptive 
capability determining its R&D resources and competences in a specific field. Specific 
competences may determine the existing knowledge stock, the direction of R&D activities and 
facilitates the assessment of expected results. Further, we take the firm’s patent portfolio as a 
proxy variable for technological specialisation or diversification, denoted by 6X . For this 
purpose, an index of specialisation of patent applications at the EPO is used6. The variable FP 
cooperation, 7X , measures the number of cooperative projects in EU-Framework programmes in 
which a firm i has participated. In order to ensure unbiased results due to firm age, only projects 
within the 5
th
 (1998 – 2002) and 6th (2002 – 2007) EU FP are included.  
 
In our model we have to control for idiosyncrasies related to different organisational types, as the 
core sample consists of organisations in the industry and the service sector, as well as public and 
private research organisations. For this purpose, dummy variables for each organisational type 
are defined. By convention, 8iX
 
= 1 if the firm i relates to the service sector, 8iX  = 0 otherwise. 
Research organisations are captured by 9iX
 
= 1; 9iX  takes the value zero otherwise. Table A in 
the Appendix gives details on the independent variables used in the different estimation models, 
their specification and the underlying data source.  
 
5  Estimation results and discussion 
 
Table 1 presents the Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for the behavioural additionality 
models as specified in the previous section, asymptotic standard errors are given in brackets. For 
each type of behavioural additionality under consideration two different model versions are 
considered: The basic versions of the model contain general profile characteristics that are – 
according to our analytical framework – firm size, firm age and export activity. The extended 
model versions are of central interest in the context of the research questions of this study. In 
                                                 
5 The underlying survey question is: “Is your project thematically based on previous work?” 
6  The index is defined by 
1
6 2
iq qi Q
X s s  where siq is the firm’s i share of patents in a specific IPC class q  
(indexed q = 1, …., 129) and qs  is the mean of IPC class q. In order to control for the time lag between R&D performance 
and patent application, patent applications with a priority date between 1997 and 2007 are considered. Patents were taken into 
account at a two-digit level (class level) corresponding to the International Patent Classification (IPC). 
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these models we add R&D related characteristics to the basic versions, involving R&D intensity, 
technological specialisation, FP cooperation and experience in research field.  The extended 
model versions further feature control variables, namely the service sector dummy and the 
research organisation dummy. Note that the basic model is nested in the extended model version.  
 
The bottom of Table 1 provides various model fit measures for comparison purposes. The 
Likelihood Ratio statistic comparing the estimated model with the constant-only null model 
increases from the basic to the corresponding extended model for all behavioural additionality 
models. This points to the first important, general result: the inclusion of R&D related firm 
characteristics is of crucial importance for improving model fit, i.e. when analysing the 
realisation of behavioural additionalities for distinct firm types from the perspective of policy 
makers, R&D relevant characteristics provide an important clue of why additionalities may 
appear in some firms, but not in other firms. 
 
In general, the estimation results are promising in the context of relevant empirical and 
theoretical literature. Concerning the basic project additionality model as given by column (1) of 
Table 1, it can be seen that all parameter estimates are statistically significant. The negative 
coefficient for firm size suggests that the likelihood of project additionality decreases with the 
level of size. The same is true for the firm age; this means that the probability for cancelling the 
whole project in case of rejection increases for smaller and younger firms. In contrast, export 
activity positively influences the realisation of project additionality. Results suggest that export 
active firms ceteris paribus have a higher probability to abandon the project if they do not receive 
public support for their initiated projects. The results of the basic project additionality model in 
general confirm earlier results from scarce previous empirical work (see, for instance, Falk 2007). 
 
However, the focus of interest is on the extended model versions including R&D relevant 
characteristics. For the extended project additionality model (column (2) of Table 1), the results 
show that a higher R&D intensity and a higher experience in research field decrease the 
probability that project additionality appears, i.e. we can confirm hypothesis (i) from our 
empirical results. R&D intensive firms have a 31% lower probability to realise project 
additionalities due to public R&D funding than non-R&D intensive firms, holding all other 
variables at their mean. One can assume that R&D intensive firms with a large knowledge stock 
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have a higher capability to select their projects from the outset. Hence, they probably conduct 
their major projects irrespective of the provision of public support. Concerning experience in 
research field, results show that prior thematic orientation and competences increase the average 
probability to continue their research activities within a project, even if public support is refused, 
by 17%. Considering the results for technological specialisation, hypothesis (iv) can be 
confirmed. Technologically diversified firms are less likely to change their behaviour due to the 
rejection of public funding, other things being equal. More specialised firms have a 25% higher 
average probability to realise project additionality than their diversified counterparts. As 
technological diversification empirically often goes in line with the level of maturity, this 
additionally supports prior findings. The parameter estimates for FP cooperation is statistically 
not significant, i.e. hypothesis (vii) has to be rejected. Therefore, one may conclude that prior FP 
cooperation experience has no significant effect on the decision of continuing or cancelling a 
project. 
 
The scale additionality model (see column (3) and column (4) of Table 1) produces mixed results. 
For the basic model, we get – as expected – almost contrary results than for the project 
additionality model. Behavioural additionality decreases with firm age, but increases with a 
firm´s export activity. The firm size does not influence the realisation of scale additionalities.  The 
results of the extended model versions show that only technological specialisation has a 
statistically significant effect on the probability of scale additionality. Technologically specialised 
firms have a 27% lower probability to re-adapt their project scale due to public funding, holding 
all other variables at their mean. Thus, hypothesis (v) is confirmed. They are more likely to 
continue their activities as originally intended. Technologically specialised firms may create 
projects at their core fields of activity. Research and development in a specific field may 
therefore be substantial for the whole strategy. In contrast, more diversified firms may run 
various projects and research activities simultaneously. A refusal of public financial support for a 
specific project may more often result in downgrading the scale of projects, as developments in a 
specific field are of minor importance and may be postponed.  
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Table 1: ML estimations for the behavioural additionality models 2006 (n = 155) 
 
Project  
additionality 
Scale  
additionality 
Cooperation 
additionality 
basic 
(1) 
extended 
(2) 
basic 
(3) 
extended 
(4) 
basic 
(5) 
extended 
(6) 
Constant 
-0.900 ** 
(0.433) 
-0.379 
(1.312) 
-2.281 *** 
(0.520) 
-1.945 
(1.693) 
-0.899 * 
(0.486) 
-1.371 ** 
(1.499) 
General characteristics       
Firm size (1) 
-0.118 * 
(0.070) 
-0.069 
(0.078) 
-0.135 
(0.083) 
-0.063 
(0.088) 
-0.043 
(0.079) 
-0.028 
(0.091) 
Firm age (2) 
-0.387 * 
(0.207) 
-0.459 ** 
(0.233) 
-0.383 * 
(0.205) 
-0.482 * 
(0.249) 
-0.155 
(0.236) 
-0.439 
(0.301) 
Export activity (3) 
-0.973 ** 
(0.417) 
-0.919 * 
(0.498) 
-1.192 ** 
(0.530) 
-1.616 ** 
(0.807) 
-0.389 
(0.455) 
-1.509 ** 
(0.623) 
R&D related characteristics      
R&D intensity (4) – 
-1.368 ** 
(0.600) 
– 
-0.785 
(0.826) 
 
– 
-0.318 
(0.614) 
Experience in  
research field (5) 
– 
-0.701 * 
(0.384) 
– 
-0.209 
(0.460) 
– 
-1.230 *** 
(0.437) 
Technological 
specialisation (6) 
– 
-1.067 ** 
(0.533) 
– 
-1.983 *** 
(0.755) 
– 
-0.153 
(0.593) 
FP cooperation (7) – 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
– 
-0.002 
(0.001) 
– 
0.002 ** 
(0.001) 
Controls       
Service sector (8) – 
-0.489 
(0.483) 
– 
-0.510 
(0.591) 
– 
-1.977 *** 
(0.683) 
Research  
organisation (9) 
– 
-1.108 * 
(0.668) 
– 
-0.289 
(0.931) 
– 
-1.070 
(0.771) 
Model fit       
Log-likelihood
 
-98.83 ** -90.26 *** 0-75.73 ** -70.64 ** -82.19 -72.94 ** 
AIC 205.66 ** 200.52 *** -159.47 ** 161.49 ** 172.38 165.88 ** 
Likelihood ratio test  -10.28 ** -27.42 *** 0-10.62 ** -20.81 ** 001.21 019.71 ** 
Notes: Breusch-Pagan Tests confirm the null hypothesis of no heteroscedasticity for all model versions; asymptotic standard 
errors given in brackets; ***significant at the 0.01 significance level, **significant at the 0.05 significance level, * significant at 
the 0.1 significance level 
 
 
No statistically significant evidence is found for the remaining R&D relevant variables in the 
extended scale additionality model. Thus, hypothesis (ii) and hypothesis (viii) have to be rejected. 
One may conclude that the realisation of scale additionality is primarily influenced by general 
firm characteristics, with the exception of the firm´s technological specialisation. Adapting the 
size of the project due to public funding appears to be rather a matter of organisational and 
structural resources and not of R&D-related resources and competences.  
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The cooperation additionality model is given by columns (5) and (6) of Table 1. Regarding 
general firm characteristics, only export activity significantly affects cooperation additionality. It 
increases the average probability to initiate new collaborations by about 27%, holding other 
variables at their mean, while firm size and firm age play no statistically significant role. 
Concerning R&D relevant characteristics, two variables significantly influence the realisation of 
cooperation additionalities, namely experience in research field and FP cooperation. Experience 
in research field lowers the probability of cooperation additionality by about 19%, holding other 
variables at their mean. The odds for cooperating with new partners are 3.43 times higher for 
firms, which are still at the initial stage in a specific field. Firms that are acquainted with the 
peculiarities and risks of researching in a technological field are, ceteris paribus, less likely to 
look for new partners. They have already developed a critical knowledge stock and are less 
dependent on external knowledge flows. Thus, hypothesis (iii) can be partly confirmed (note that 
the estimate for R&D intensity is statistically not significant). The parameter estimate for FP 
cooperation shows a significant positive sign. Experience in cooperating and knowledge transfer 
increases – other things being equal – the likelihood of including new partners in the project 
consortium. Hypothesis (ix) can thus be confirmed, though the effect is rather small. Engaging in 
an additional FP cooperation increases the odds of cooperation additionality only marginally. 
Since we find no significant influence of a firm´s technological specialisation on the realisation 
of cooperation additionalities, hypothesis (vi) has to be rejected.  
 
6   Closing comments 
 
The concept of behavioural additionality has come into fairly wide use in evaluation of R&D 
policy programmes in recent years. The notion of behavioural additionality refers to changes in 
the way a firm performs its R&D activities induced by public policy support (Buisseret et al. 
1995). Up to now, we know only little about the relationship of the realisation of behavioural 
additionalities and distinct firm characteristics at the firm level. Thus, the objective of the study at 
hand was to estimate the influence of distinct firm characteristics on the realisation of different 
types of behavioural additionalities, namely project additionality, scale additionality and 
cooperation additionality, at the firm level. 
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In our analytical framework we focused – in contrast to scarce previous empirical work (see, for 
instance, Falk 2007) – on different R&D relevant characteristics, such as R&D intensity or 
experience in a specific research field that may influence the occurrence of behavioural 
additionalities. In our study, we employed a binary regression modelling perspective to disclose 
the link between the realisation of behavioural additionalities and distinct firm characteristics. We 
estimated logistic binary probability models for each type of behavioural additionality under 
consideration, using data from a survey among 155 firms that were funded by the Austrian STI 
policy programme Intelligent Transport Systems and Services – IV2S in the year 2006. We 
combined observed behavioural additionalities – as captured by the survey – with distinct firm 
characteristics by matching the survey based information with other databases such as the Aurelia 
database, the internal database of the Austrian Research Promotion Agency (FFG), the EUPRO 
database of the Austrian Institute of Technology, and the PATSTAT database of the European 
Patent  Office (EPO). 
 
The results of the empirical analysis provide interesting insights, in particular for policy makers, 
on the relationship between distinct firm characteristics and the realisation of different types of 
behavioural additionalities. First, when analysing why certain firms realize behavioural 
additionalities as a result of public R&D subsidies, it is of crucial importance to take R&D 
relevant characteristics into account. Model fit significantly increases when such characteristics 
are added to standard model specifications featuring general firm characteristics such as firm size 
or firm age only. Second, the influence of R&D related firm characteristics differs across specific 
types of behavioural additionality under consideration. While R&D related resources and 
competencies play an important role for the realisation of project additionalities, they do not 
affect scale additionalities, and only partly influence cooperation additionalities. R&D intensity 
and previous experience in the research field significantly lowers the probability for project 
additionalities. A higher experience in the research field, moreover, decreases the likelihood of 
cooperation additionality. One may conclude that firms familiar with the peculiarities of a very 
specific technological field are acquainted with relevant partners, and, thus, are less likely to look 
for new partners in the field. In contrast, scale additionalities such as size adaptations of projects 
resulting from public R&D subsidies are not affected by R&D resources and competences, but 
are mainly related to general firm characteristics such as firm size and firm age. Third, the 
technological specialisation of the firm plays a crucial role for behavioural additionalities, in 
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particular concerning project additionality and scale additionality. Technologically specialised 
firms have a higher probability to realise project additionalities, but they show a lower probability 
to re-adapt their project scale due to public funding, i.e. to realize scale additionalities. Fourth, 
previous international cooperation shows no or rather small effects on behavioural additionalities. 
Only for cooperation additionalities the empirical results point to a positive – but rather small – 
effect of previous international collaboration behaviour.  
 
These empirical results point to significant implications for STI policy makers: First, R&D 
relevant characteristic are to be taken into account when analysing the realisation of behavioural 
additionalities at the firm level. Second, direct R&D promotion of firms with very high R&D 
resources and competences may be misallocated regarding the stimulation of behavioural 
additionalities. Third, future policy programmes that support collaborative R&D should 
especially address firms with lower experience in a specific research field, since highly 
experienced firms realise lower cooperation additionalities. Fourth, since technologically 
specialised firms are more likely to realise project additionalities, i.e. to cancel the project 
without public funding, such firms should be particularly considered in the design of future 
policy measures. 
 
Furthermore, the study confirms that econometric firm-level analyses of survey data merged with 
additional databases are an appropriate instrument for policy evaluation. In the context of STI 
policy, this delivers new insights into specific impacts and influences of public R&D funding 
which might in turn be valuable for future policy designs. However, the study is afflicted with 
some limitations raising issues for further research: Underlying data is spatially and 
technologically limited to the Austrian transport and mobility area. This may control for 
intervening environmental factors, but limit to a certain extent the general validity of results. 
Differences between particular sectors and regions are conceivable. Supranational analyses with 
an extended set of data might further provide significant findings on the interactions of public 
R&D assistance and firm-specific characteristics.  
 
Acknowledgements 
We gratefully acknowledge Josef Fröhlich (AIT), Anton Geyer (Technopolis), Evelinde Grassegger (BMVIT), and 
Josef Säckl (FFG) for their contribution and valuable comments making the work on this paper possible. 
23 
 
References 
 
Arrow KJ (1962) Economic welfare and the allocation of resources for invention. In: Nelson RR (ed.) The Rate and 
Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pp. 609-625. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ  
Autio E, Gustafsson R and Kanninen S (2008) First- and second-order additionality and learning outcomes in 
collaborative R&D programs. Research Policy 37(1), 59-76 
Barney JB (1991) Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management 17(1), 99-120 
Breschi S, Lissoni F and Malerba F (2003) Knowledge-relatedness in ﬁrm technological diversiﬁcation. Research 
Policy 32(1), 69-87 
Buisseret TJ, Cameron HM and Georghiou L (1995) What difference does it make? Additionality in the public 
support of R&D in large firms. International Journal of Technology Management 10, 587-600 
Clarysse B, Wright M and Mustar P (2009) Behavioural additionality of R&D subsidies: A learning perspective. 
Research Policy 38(10), 1517-1533 
Clarysee B, Bilsen V and Steurs G (2006) Behavioural additionality of the R&D subsidies Programme of IWT-
Flanders (Belgium). In: OECD (ed.) Government R&D Funding and Company Behaviour – Measuring 
Behavioural Additionality, pp. 91-114. OECD, Paris 
Cohen WM (2010) Fifty years of empirical studies of innovative activity and performance. In: Hall BH and 
Rosenberg N (eds.) Handbook of the Economics of Innovation. Volume 1, pp. 129-213. Elsevier B.V., 
Amsterdam 
Cohen WM and Levinthal DA (1990) Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly 35(1), 128-152  
David PA, Hall BH and Toole AA (2000) Is public R&D a complement or substitute for private R&D? A review of 
the econometric evidence. Research Policy 29(4), 497-529 
Edquist C (2005) Systems of innovation: Perspectives and challenges. In: Fagerberg J, Mowery DC and Nelson RR 
(eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Innovation, pp. 181-208. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
Falk R (2007) Measuring the effect of public support schemes on firms' innovation activities - survey evidence from 
Austria. Research Policy 36, 665-679 
Fischer MM (2001) Innovation, knowledge creation and systems of Innovation. The Annals of Regional Science 
35(2), 199-216 
Galende J and De la Fuente JM (2003) Internal factors determining a firm’s innovative behaviour. Research Policy 
32(5), 715-736  
Garcia-Vega M (2006) Does technological diversiﬁcation promote innovation? An empirical analysis for European 
ﬁrms. Research Policy 35(2), 230-246 
Georghiou L (2002) Impact and additionality of innovation policy. In: Boekelt P (ed.) Innovation policy and 
sustainable development: Can public innovation incentives make a difference? pp. 57-65. IWT Studies 40, 
IWT-Observatory, Brussels 
24 
 
Georghiou L and Clarysee B (2006) Evaluation government financing of business R&D: Measuring behavioural 
additionality - introduction and synthesis. In: OECD (ed.) Government R&D Funding and Company 
Behaviour – Measuring Behavioural Additionality, pp. 9-38. OECD, Paris 
Geyer A (2006) Interimsevaluierung Strategieprogramm intelligente Verkehrssysteme und Services (IV2S). 
Endbericht. Technopolis, Wien 
Greene WH (2003) Econometric Analysis. 5th edition, Pearson Prentice Hall, Upper Saddle River, NJ 
Hsu FM (2009) The effect of government-sponsored R&D programmes on additionality in recipient firms in Taiwan. 
Technovation 29(3), 204-217 
Klette T, Moen J and Griliches Z (2000) Do subsidies to commercial R&D reduce market failure? Research Policy 
29, 471–496 
Jenks GF (1967) The data model concept in statistical mapping. International Yearbook of Cartography 7, 186-190 
Larosse J (2004) Conceptual and empirical challenges of evaluating the effectiveness of innovation policies with 
behavioural additionality. In: Georghiou L, Clarysee B, Steurs B, Bilsen V and Larosse J (eds.) 'Making the 
difference'. The evaluation of 'behavioural additionality' of R&D subsidies, Chapter 3, pp. 57-69. IWT-
Studies 48, IWT Observatory, Brussels 
Luukkonen T (2000) Additionality of EU framework programmes. Research Policy 29(6), 711-724 
Luukkonen T (1998) The difficulties in assessing the impact of EU framework programmes. Research Policy 27, 
599–610 
Long JS and Freese J (2001) Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata. 2nd edition, Stata 
Press, Texas 
Nelson RR (1959) The simple economics of basic scientific research. Journal of Political Economy 67(3), 297-306  
OECD (ed.) (2006) Government R&D Funding and Company Behaviour: Measuring Behavioural Additionality. 
OECD, Paris  
Paier M and Scherngell T (2011) Determinants of collaboration in European R&D networks: Empirical evidence 
from a discrete choice model. Industry and Innovation 18(1), 89-104 
Teece DJ (2010) Technological innovation and the theory of the firm: The role of enterprise-level knowledge, 
complementarities, and (dynamic) capabilities. In: Hall BH and Rosenberg N (eds.) Handbook of the 
Economics of Innovation. Volume 1, pp. 679-730. Elsevier B.V., Amsterdam  
Teece DJ, Pisano G and Shuen A (1997) Dynamic capabilities and strategic management. Strategic Management 
Journal 18(7), 509-533 
  
25 
 
Appendix 
Table A: List of independent variables 
Variable name Type Description Source 
General characteristics    
Firm size  Numeric 
No. of total employees in 
logarithmic form 
Aurelia  
Firm age  Categorical 
Period of existence from 
founding year until project 
launch; five categories* based 
on natural breaks (Jenks 1967)** 
Aurelia  
Export activity  Dummy variable 
1 if exports are recorded;  
0 otherwise 
Aurelia  
R&D relevant characteristics    
R&D Intensity  Dummy variable 
1 if R&D intensity is higher than 
50%; 0 otherwise;  
based on natural breaks (Jenks 
1967)** 
internal FFG data 
Experience in  
research field  
Dummy variable 
1 if project is based on 
preliminary work; 0 otherwise 
IV2S survey data 
Technological  
specialisation  
Dummy variable 
1 if index of specialisation is 
higher than 0.69;  
0 otherwise; based on natural 
breaks (Jenks 1967) **  
EPO Patstat  
FP cooperation  Numeric 
No. of projects in  
5th and 6th EU-FPs 
EUPRO  
Controls    
Service sector  Dummy variable 
1 if respective sector;  
0 otherwise  
IV2S survey data 
Research organisation Dummy variable 
1 if respective sector;  
0 otherwise  
IV2S survey data 
Industry Dummy variable Reference category IV2S survey data 
Notes: * (less than 20; 21-48; 49-69; 70-82; higher than 82). ** The natural breaks classification method according to Jenks (1967) 
is a data classification method that seeks to minimise the average deviation within a class from the respective mean, while 
maximising the deviation from the means of the other classes. 
 
 We study changes in firms' innovation behaviour resulting from public 
R&D funding 
 
 We estimate how firm characteristics affect the realisation of such 
additionalities 
 
 Large and R&D intensive firms less likely substantiate behavioural 
additionality 
 
 Small, young and specialised firms more likely realise behavioural 
additionalities 
 
 In a policy context, R&D support of R&D intensive firms may be 
misallocated 
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